Non Interference 8] has been proposed for modelling and analysing information ow in systems. In 4,7] we have indeed shown that the Non Interference property called NDC can be applied also in the area of network security, for the analysis of typical cryptographic protocol properties (e.g., authentication, non-repudiation). In this paper we extend the results of 4, 7] by showing that NDC can be also easily adapted to detect secrecy attacks over networks.
Introduction
Secrecy is one of the main issues in security. In general, a system (or a protocol) preserves the secrecy of a set of data if it guarantees that nonauthorized users/entities never gain access to such data.
In 5,6] a non interference property called Non Deducibility on Compositions (NDC) has been proposed for the detection of information ows inside systems. It is a strong property which guarantees that no information ow is possible from a set of high level users (representing the authorized users) to the set of low level ones (who are not authorized to access secret data). 1 Partially supported by MURST Progetto \Certi cazione automatica di programmi mediante interpretazione astratta" In this paper we show how NDC can be easily adapted for analysing secrecy in networks. Indeed, the main aim of our current research is to nd a uniform approach for de ning the many variants of security properties in such a way that they can be all seen as speci c instances of a general NDC-based scheme (called GNDC 7] ). This is badly needed in order to compare, classify and evaluate the merits of the various de nitions and, possibly, to provide general, e ective proof techniques that can be applied suitably for all properties.
To this aim, in 7] we have presented a process algebra, called CryptoSPA (in turn an improvement of SPA 6] which borrows some concepts from the language de ned in 13]), that is expressive enough to model a large class of systems, e.g., (non mobile) security protocols. CryptoSPA has been chosen as the common model for comparing the various properties through the general, unifying scheme. The idea behind is essentially non interference, proposed many years ago 8] in a completely di erent context to study information ow in computer systems and widely studied in 5, 6, 14] . Roughly, a system is secure if its behaviour cannot be signi cantly altered (hence, no interference is possible) when executed in a hostile environment. This property is a direct generalization of NDC 5, 6] .
Some security properties (e.g., authentication as in 10, 17] and denial of service as in 16]) have been shown as instances of our general scheme in 7] . The main goal of this paper is to show that also secrecy can be easily de ned in our NDC-based framework. This is interesting as it strengthens our claim that non interference plays an important role in the speci cation and analysis of security protocols. Indeed, non interference seems the strongest property that can be de ned for cryptographic protocols (see also 7] ). Moreover, it shows that non interference, originally proposed for detecting information ows in systems, is also pro table for revealing secrecy attacks in network security.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we de ne the model; in Section 3 we de ne secrecy as a NDC-based property; Section 4 reports a simple example; nally, Section 5 is about future work.
The Model
In this section we report from 7] the language we use for the speci cation of authentication properties and protocols. It is called Cryptographic Security Process Algebra (CryptoSPA for short), and it is basically a variant of value-passing CCS 15] , where the processes are provided with some primitives for manipulating messages. In particular, processes can perform message encryption and decryption, and also construct complex messages by composing together simpler ones.
The CryptoSPA Syntax
CryptoSPA syntax is based on the following elements: 2 A set I = fa; b; : : :g of input channels, a set O = f a; b; : : :g of output ones;
A set M of basic messages and a set K of encryption keys with a function We basically have all the standard operators of value-passing CCS. In particular, the synchronization between parallel processes allows to exchange a value through the following simple mechanism: a system c(x):E 1 k c m:E 2 can execute an internal action moving to E 1 m=x] kE 2 , where E 1 m=x] is the process E 1 with all the occurrences of x replaced by m. Thus, process c(x):E 1 , is indeed receiving in variable x the value m sent out by process c m:E 2 .
Besides the standard value-passing CCS operators, we have an additional one that has been introduced in order to model message handling and cryptography. Informally, the hm 1 : : :m r i`r ule x]E 1 ; E 2 process tries to deduce an information z from the tuple of messages hm 1 : : : m r i through one application of rule`r ule ; if it succeeds then it behaves like E 1 z=x], otherwise it behaves like E 2 ; for example, given a rule`d ec for decryption, process We call E the set of all the CryptoSPA terms, and we de ne sort(E) to be the set of all the channels syntactically occurring in the term E.
The Operational Semantics of CryptoSPA
The semantics of CryptoSPA is given through labelled transition systems. A labelled transition system (lts) is essentially an automaton with possibly innitely many states. It is de ned as a triple (S; T; !) such that S is a set of states, T is a set of labels (actions) and ! S T S is a set of labelled transitions. (S 1 ; ; S 2 ) 2 ! (or equivalently S 1 ?! S 2 ) means that the system can move from the state S 1 to the state S 2 through the action .
In order to model message handling and cryptography, in Figure 1 we de ne an inference system which formalizes the way messages may be manipulated by processes. It is indeed quite similar to those used by many authors (see, e.g., 9,12]). In particular it can combine two messages obtaining a pair (rulè pair ); it can extract one message from a pair (rules`f st and`s nd ); it can encrypt a message m with a key k obtaining fmg k and nally decrypt a message of the form fmg k only if it has the corresponding (inverse) key k ?1 (rules`e nc and`d ec ). We denote with D( ) the set of messages that can be deduced by applying the inference rules on the messages in . Note that we are assuming encryption as completely reliable. Indeed we do not allow any kind of cryptographic attack, e.g., the guessing of secret keys. This permits to observe the attacks that can be carried out even if cryptography is completely reliable. For the sake of readability, we omit the termination 0 at the end of every agent specications, e.g., we write a in place of a:0. We also write m = m We want to analyze the execution of P with no intrusions, we thus consider P n fcg, since the restriction guarantees that c is a completely secure channel.
We obtain a system which can only execute action out m In the next section we analyze the execution of this simple protocol in a hostile environment.
Hostile Environments
In this section we report the characterization of hostile environments as given in 7] . Such a characterization is necessary to analyze protocols where some information is assumed to be secret, as it always happens in cryptographic protocols. Basically, a hostile environment is an agent which tries to attack a protocol by stealing and faking the information which is transmitted on the CryptoSPA public channels in set C. In principle, such an agent could be modeled as a generic process X which can communicate only through the channels belonging to C, i.e., X 2 E C where E C def = fE 2 E j sort(E) Cg. However It intercepts a message sent over channel c and tries to decrypt it using key k. If it succeeds, then it makes the message public by sending it as plaintext over channel pub. Note that X(k) belongs to E C since sort(X(m; k)) = fc; pubg.
Consider now X(k AB ) and the following protocol \under attack" (note that we put X inside the scope of restriction):
(P k X(k AB )) n C After one step, X(k AB ) will be able to execute pub m A , representing the fact that m A is not secret anymore. 5 This happens since X(k AB ) is able to guess k AB , but we would like to forbid such behaviour since, as mentioned above, we are interested in attacks that can be carried out even when cryptography is completely reliable.
This problem can be solved by imposing some constraints on the initial data that are known by the intruders. Given a process E, we call ID(E) the set of messages that syntactically appear in E. Intuitively, this set contains all the messages that are initially known by E. Now, let I M be the initial knowledge that we would like to give to the intruder X, i.e., the public information such as the names of the entities and the public keys, plus some possible private data of the intruder (e.g., its private key or nonces). For a certain intruder X, we want that all the messages in ID(X) are deducible from I .
The set E I C of processes which can communicate on a subset of C and have an initial knowledge bound by I can be thus de ned as follows: E I C = fX j X 2 E C and ID(X) D( I )g
We consider as hostile processes only those belonging to this particular set. In the example above, if we require that k AB is not deducible from I (i.e., it is not public) we can easily see that the behavior of X(k AB ) cannot be simulated by any process in E I C . 5 Indeed, such an event is not directly observable since pub 2 C. In Section 3 we will show how to solve this.
2.4 Trace Equivalence
Most of the security properties that have been proposed for the analysis of security protocols are based on the simple notion of trace: two processes are equivalent if they exactly show the same execution sequences (called traces).
In order to formally de ne it, we need a transition relation which does not consider internal moves.
De nition 2. De nition 2.4 For any E 2 E the set T(E) of traces associated with E is T(E) = f 2 (Act n f g) j 9E 0 : E =) E 0 g. F can execute all the traces of E (notation E trace F) i T(E) T(F). E and F are trace equivalent (notation E trace F) i E trace F and F trace E, i.e., i T(E) = T(F).
Secrecy in Protocols through Non Interference
In this section we show that NDC can be easily adapted for analysing secrecy in networks. NDC is de ned as follows:
De nition 3.1 A process S is NDC i 8X 2 E I C (S k X) n C trace S n C
In other words S is NDC if every possible enemy X which has an initial knowledge limited by I is not able to signi cantly change the behaviour of the system. Note that S n C is the system S where the public channels C are made private, i.e., where no enemy can intercept or introduce fake messages.
Consider now a protocol P(M) and assume that we want to verify if P(M) preserves the secrecy of message M. This can be done by proving that every enemy which does not know message M, cannot learn it by interacting with P(M). Thus, we need a mechanism that noti es whenever an enemy is learning M. We implement it through a simple process called knowledge noti er which reads from a public channel c k 2 C n sort(P(M)) not used in P(M) and executes a learntM action if the read value is exactly equal to M. For a generic message m, it can be de ned as follows:
KN(m) def = c k (y): m = y]learntm We assume that learnt is a special channel that is never used by protocols and is not public, i.e., learnt 6 2 sort(P) C. We now consider P 0 (m) def = P(m) k KN(m), i.e., a modi ed protocol where the learning of M is now noti ed. A very intuitive de nition of secrecy can be thus given as follows : 7 De nition 3.2 P(m) preserves the secrecy of m i for all (secret) messages M 2 M n D( I ) and for all enemies X 2 E I C there exist no trace 1 : : : n such that 1 : : : n learntM 2 T((P 0 (M) k X) n C).
In other words, we require that for every secret M and for every enemy X, process (P 0 (M) k X) n C never executes an learntM action.
This de nition models very well the notion of secrecy. On the one hand, if (P 0 (M) k X) n C executes learntM then M has been sent over the public channel c k by either P(M) or X. In both cases the message is not secret anymore. In the former situation P(M) is making M public, while in the latter X has for sure learned M before sending it over c k . On the other hand, if an enemy X is able to learn message M then there also exists an enemy X 0 that will send such a message over channel c k and thus (P 0 (M) k X) n C will eventually execute learntM.
We want now to use NDC to perform this check. Note that NDC already contains the quanti cation over all the possible enemies. The following holds: Proposition 3.3 Consider a protocol P(m) such that sort(P(m)) Cnfc k g.
Then, P(m) preserves the secrecy of m in the sense of De nition 3.2 i 8M 2 M n D( I ) P 0 (M) is NDC Proof. ()) Note that P 0 (M) n C trace 0, since sort(P(m)) C n fc k g. As a matter of fact, learntM is the only action that P 0 (M)nC could execute (it is the only one which is not captured by the restriction over C) but P(M) cannot send messages over c k and learnt. Moreover, we have that sort(X) C, thus the only action that is executable by (P 0 (M) k X)nC is again learntM. Now if, by De nition 3.2, (P 0 (M) k X)nC never executes an learntM action, then we obtain (P 0 (M) k X) n C trace 0 trace P 0 (M) n C for every X, i.e., P 0 (M) is NDC.
(() If P 0 (M) is NDC then for all enemies X we have (P 0 (M) k X) n C trace P 0 (M)nC trace 0. This of course means that (P 0 (M) k X)nC cannot execute learntM and holds for every possible M.
Intuitively, this result means that NDC corresponds to secrecy when (i) the only action we observe is exactly learnt M and (ii) channel c k is a special one that cannot be used in P(m).
These requirements are both captured by the condition sort(P(m)) C n fc k g, i.e., the speci cation P(m) can use neither c k nor channels that are not public, thus not restricted in the composition with the enemy. Usually these particular channels are called observable (e.g. learnt is an observable channel). Note that such a condition is not restrictive as it only requires a particular form of the speci cation. Moreover, it is consistent with the idea of NDC-based veri cations (see, e.g., 4,7]): we x the property (NDC) and we capture di erent properties by just de ning di erent observable actions. 8 
An Example
In this section we show through a simple example how the NDC-based secrecy veri cation works. We consider a simpli ed version of the The main di erences with respect to the original protocol is that here messages 1 and 2 do not contain timestamps (as studied in 1] for authentication). Moreover, in message 1 the identi er B is sent as plaintext while in the original protocol it is encrypted with the session key (this modi cation generates, as we will show, a secrecy attack). We specify the protocol as follows: Since P(n) only uses channels c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 we have that sort(P(n)) C n fc k g. It is easy to see that process (P 0 (M) kX) n C 6 trace P 0 (M) n C as the former process can execute learnt M. Here the secrecy attack is not possible anymore. We can prove this automatically through the CoSeC/CVS tools 6,4], as discussed in the next section.
Future Work
In order to compare various formalizations of security properties, we have de ned in 7] a general scheme that permits to capture a number of properties (e.g., authentication as in 10] and denial of service as in 16]) as particular instances of the scheme itself. The results presented in this paper have allowed us to extend the set of properties de ned in the scheme. Our main issue is now to nd comparison results in order to obtain a complete classi cations in the style of 5,10], which could help in evaluating the relative merits of all such properties.
Another aim of our current research is to provide general, e ective proof techniques that can be suitably applied to a set of security properties. Indeed, the de nition of security properties as instances of the GNDC scheme 7] allows us to use a uniform analysis technique in order to check all of them. For example in 4] we show how NDC can be used to check authentication properties. Moreover, in this paper we have seen that secrecy can be easily de ned as NDC. This permits the reuse of automatic checking techniques for NDC in order to check secrecy over CryptoSPA protocols; indeed if I is nite then it is possible to nd a most-general intruder Top such that NDC is reduced to just one check (P 0 (M) k Top) n C trace P 0 (M) n C (see 7] for more details) that can be veri ed using the tool in 4]. This kind of veri cation can be, in principle, applied to all the properties we have de ned in our scheme. Moreover, the exibility of the GNDC-scheme makes it possible to verify di erent properties in just one (NDC) check 3]. An alternative way of analysing security properties with the GNDC scheme is to apply compositional analysis techniques as done in 13, 14] . These can 10 be used even when the most-general intruder approach described above is not applicable. An automatic veri cation can be carried out only if we x in advance the maximum number of instances of A and B (as done in the example of Section 4). Some recent results (see, e.g., 11]) show that the veri cation of a xed number of sessions of a protocol can be, in some cases, su cient to prove the general correctness of such a protocol. It would be interesting to have similar results for GNDC, since they could be applied to all the properties de ned in the scheme.
